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The  Objective:  More  Capable,  More 
Deployed  
The  Protocol  on  Permanent  Structured 
Cooperation  in  Defence  (PSCD)  annexed  to  the 
Lisbon Treaty sets out two objectives (Art. 1), one 
of  which,  i.e. to  supply  or contribute to  a  Battle 
Group, has already been achieved by most Member 
States.  This  leaves  a  single  major  objective:  to 
proceed  more  intensively  to  develop  defence 
capacities, which must of course be available and 
deployable, as Art. 2 (c) says. Thus PSCD should 
enable  participating  Member  States  (pMS)  to 
increase  at  a  quicker  pace  than  at  present  their 
national level of ambition in terms of deployability 
and sustainability. In other words pMS will be able 
to  field  more  capabilities  for  the  full  range  of 
operations in all frameworks in which they engage: 
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 
NATO, the UN, and others. In doing so, they will 
contribute  to  the  achievement  of  the  overall 
objectives  for  the  Common Foreign and  Security 
Policy (CFSP) and CSDP to which they have agreed 
in the Lisbon Treaty.  
Of course, if all Member States had the will, they 
could  do  more  using  the  existing EU-bodies  and 
mechanisms,  notably  the  European  Defence 
Agency (EDA) – but that collective will seems to be 
lacking. PSCD has the potential to bring real added 
value  therefore.  Now  is  the  time  to  consider  it, 
making full use of the momentum created by the 
implementation of the Lisbon Treaty.  
Through  PSCD,  pMS  can  step  up  their  national 
contribution  and/or,  as  stressed  in  Art.  1, 
participate  in  multinational  forces,  European 
equipment  programmes  and  the  activities  of  the 
In  this  Security  Policy  Brief,  Sven 
Biscop  and  Jo  Coelmont  outline  a 
concrete  proposal  to  implement 
Permanent Structured Cooperation, the 
new defence mechanism introduced by 
the  Lisbon  Treaty.  Setting  real  but 
realistic  binding  criteria  for 
participation will allow Member States 
to invest more, better, and together in 
deployable  capabilities.  For  the  first 
time,  participating  Member  States 
would create a binding commitment in 
the  field  of  defence  and  allow  an  EU 
body, the European Defence Agency, to 
assess their performance. 
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EDA. The main problem of Europe’s armed forces 
is fragmentation: limited defence budgets spent on 
a  plethora  of  small-scale  capabilities  result  in 
disproportionately  high  spending  on  “overhead” 
(and  useless  intra-European  duplications)  and, 
consequently,  less  spending  on  deployable 
capabilities and actual operations. To overcome this 
low cost-effectiveness, multinational cooperation is 
a must. Hence PSCD must be inclusive: the more 
pMS, the more synergies and effects of scale can be 
created.  Thus,  the  challenge  is  to  reconcile 
inclusiveness and ambition, i.e. to translate Art. 2 of 
the Protocol into quantitative proportional criteria 
that allow all Member States to participate but that 
do entail a real commitment.  
Criteria for Participation: Realistic but Real  
Art. 2 of the Protocol mentions five areas which 
now have to be operationalized by pMS:  
•  To  agree  on  objectives  for  the  level  of 
investment in defence equipment;  
•  To  “bring  their  defence  apparatus  into  line 
with  each  other  as  far  as  possible”,  by 
harmonizing  military  needs,  pooling,  and, 
“where appropriate”, specialization;  
•  To  enhance  their  forces’  availability, 
interoperability,  flexibility  and  deployability, 
notably  by  setting  “common  objectives 
regarding the commitment of forces”;  
•  To  address  the  shortfalls  identified  by  the 
Capability  Development  Mechanism  (CDM), 
including through multinational approaches;  
•  To  take  part,  “where  appropriate”,  in 
equipment programmes in the context of the 
EDA.  
When translating Art. 2 into concrete criteria, pMS 
must take into account that criteria for participation 
must be realistic, i.e. they must be within reach of 
the majority of Member States, and must stimulate 
them  to  tackle  the  obstacles  to  deployability  and 
sustainability, notably by addressing  the  capability 
shortfalls identified in the Headline Goal process.  
This has 3 implications:  
•  pMS cannot be expected to fulfil the criteria at 
the  launching  of  PSCD:  criteria  must  be 
fulfilled by an agreed deadline.  
•  Criteria  that  are  unrealistic  and  cannot  be 
expected  to  generate  more  deployable 
capabilities  in  a  reasonable  timeframe,  e.g. 
defence  expenditures  representing  2%  of 
GDP, should be avoided. This is especially true 
in times of economic crisis.  
•  PSCD must not just focus on the input, i.e. the 
level and manner of spending, but also on the 
desired output, i.e. on deployable capabilities. 
The  obstacles  and  capability  gaps  are  well-
known, hence there is no need to concentrate 
on developing a new Headline Goal, which will 
simply  result  in  a  very  similar  document. 
Rather PSCD will be a way of achieving the 
existing  HG2010  –  which  must  indeed  be 
considered a living document – in a reasonable 
timeframe. That is the desired output.  
Taking  these  implications  into  account,  the 
following criteria can be envisaged – these must be 
seen as one set, to be pursued simultaneously:  
•  Criterion 1: The overall objective of PSCD is 
that  pMS  increase  their  deployability  and 
sustainability  by  an  agreed  %  by  an  agreed 
deadline, e.g. by 25% in 5 years and by 50% in 
10  years,  until  they  have  reached  an  agreed 
target,  e.g.  50%  deployability  and  10% 
sustainability (to the latter most Member States 
have already agreed in the context of NATO). 
Thus  if  PSCD  is  launched  in  2010,  a  pMS 
which  now  has  the  ambition  to  always  have 
1000  troops  in  the  field,  should  e.g.  aim  to 
continually  field  1250  by  2015,  and  1500  by 
2020. The objective could be detailed for each 
component,  army,  navy  and  air  force,  and 
might also be expressed as  a  % of  the  total 
population  of  each  pMS,  as  a  measure  of 
solidarity and burden-sharing. How to achieve 
this  (enhancing  cost-effectiveness,  pooling, 
specialization etc.) is at the discretion of each 
individual pMS, but the final objective is the 
same for all.   
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•  Criterion 2: In view of solidarity and burden-
sharing, pMS should strive to harmonize their 
defence  expenditures,  particularly  those  pMS 
spending  less  than  the EU average (in  2008, 
1,63%  of  GDP  for  the  26  Member  States 
participating  in  the  EDA).  At  the  very  least, 
pMS  spending  less  should  commit  not  to 
further  decrease  their  defence  expenditures, 
neither in real terms nor in % of GDP.  
•  Criterion  3:  pMS  will  contribute  in  ratio  of 
their GDP to the EDA-initiated projects aimed 
at  addressing  the  shortfalls  identified  in  the 
Headline  Goal  process.  Obviously,  pMS 
cannot  take  part  in  each  and  every  EDA 
project, so they can select those in which to 
participate, but their financial contribution to 
those specific projects must represent a share 
of the total cost of all EDA projects combined 
that is reflective of their GDP.  
•  Criterion  4:  In  order  to  reinforce  political 
solidarity and stimulate cooperation, pMS will 
participate  in  all  CSDP  operations  requiring 
military  assets  (of  the  unanimous  Council 
decision to launch which they are of course a 
part), with military forces, deployed in theatre, 
and listed in  the Statement of Requirements; 
the size and type are left to the discretion of 
each individual pMS.  
The  aim  of  PSCD  is  not  to  punish  or  exclude 
Member  States.  Maximum  effect  requires 
encouraging  all  Member  States  to  generate  more 
deployable  capabilities,  by  allowing  as  many  as 
possible to participate in PSCD at their own level of 
means,  hence  this  proposal  for  realistic  but  real 
criteria. PSCD should be an attractive forum, for 
those able and willing to join when it is launched, 
for those that might join later, and even for those 
opting to “wait and see”. This will not only ensure 
that  the  full  potential  of  PSCD  for  capability 
development is explored, but will also give a new 
dynamic to CSDP as a whole. Working towards the 
objectives of PSCD will have obvious implications 
for  budgetary  efficiency,  capabilities,  armaments 
cooperation, R&D, the defence market, as well as 
interoperability  and  joint  participation  in 
operations,  and,  finally,  for  overall  political 
solidarity.  
PSCD  as  a  Permanent  Capability 
Generation Conference   
Fulfilling these criteria will ensure that pMS have 
money to spend – the third criterion should help to 
ensure  that  they  will  spend  it  where  it  is  most 
needed.  Experience  shows  however  that  even 
repeated calls to reconsider and harmonize national 
defence  planning  in  order  to  focus  on  the 
commonly identified capability shortfalls yield little 
results.  Useful  inspiration  can  be  found  in  the 
method used to launch CSDP operations: a Force 
Generation Conference.  
Within PSCD the EDA can organize a “Capability 
Generation Conference” aimed at remedying each 
commonly  identified shortfall  within  a reasonable 
timeframe  and  functioning  as  a  peer  review  of 
investment plans. This implies that pMS are willing:  
•  To  revisit  their  national  defence  planning, 
without any taboos.  
•  To do away with national capability initiatives 
proven to be redundant.  
•  To  pool  assets  and  capabilities  in  order  to 
generate savings.  
•  To contribute to the programmes launched to 
fill the shortfalls in function of GDP, as per 
criterion 3.  
•  To  actively  contribute  to  negotiations  for  as 
long as it takes to achieve success.  
This would indeed result in a permanent conference 
– but also in a permanently relevant EDA.  
“End-to-End”  Multinational  Cooperation: 
Pooling  
The reality is that many pMS will not be able to 
meet  the  criteria  and  contribute  significant 
capabilities  if  they  maintain  the  same  range  of 
nationally  organized  capabilities  that  they  possess 
today.  Therefore  identifying the  opportunities  for 
multinational cooperation is an essential instrument 
to  achieve  PSCD,  allowing  pMS  to  contribute 
relevant capabilities in a cost-effective way.   
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The EDA will have the bird’s eye view: based on 
the  information  which  in  the  context  of  the 
Capability Development Plan (CDP) pMS already 
provide (and must continually update) about their 
plans  and  programmes,  and  in  combination  with 
the progressive results of the Capability Generation 
Conference, it will be able to identify opportunities 
for cooperation.  
Multinational cooperation  does  not  imply  that  all 
pMS  in  PSCD  cooperate  in  all  capability  areas. 
Rather within the single PSCD a set of overlapping 
clusters  will  emerge,  with  e.g.  pMS  1,  2  and  3 
cooperating  in  area  X  and  pMS  2,  3,  4  and  5 
cooperating in area Y.  This  cooperation can take 
various  forms,  from  joint  procurement  or 
development  projects  but  with  the  aim  of 
afterwards  equipping  national  formations,  to 
pooling, i.e. the creation of permanent multinational 
formations.  The  latter  type  of  “end-to-end” 
cooperation will be the most effective in terms of 
enhancing  cost  effectiveness,  but  the  beauty  of 
PSCD  is  its  flexibility:  it  functions  as  a  wedding 
agency for those pMS seeking cooperation – which 
should stop flirting with the concept and implement 
it  –  but  without  obliging  pMS  that  prefer  to 
contribute nationally to engage in it.  
The model for pooling can be provided by EATC: 
deployable  national  assets,  in  this  case  transport 
aircraft, remain clearly identifiable and manned by 
national personnel, but are co-located on one base, 
where all support functions are multinationalized, as 
are  the  command  &  control  arrangements.  Thus 
pooling can still offer great flexibility: each pMS in 
EATC has  to guarantee that  its  personnel in the 
support and in the command & control structures 
will be available whenever a pMS deploys its aircraft 
– but no pMS is obliged to deploy its own actual 
aircraft each and every time another pMS deploys 
its aircraft for a specific operation.  
The same model can be applied to fighter wings or 
army  divisions.  E.g.  by  anchoring  the  Belgian 
median brigade more firmly in the Eurocorps, cost 
effectiveness  can  be  enhanced  because  each 
individual pMS no longer has to nationally organize 
all support functions required at division and corps 
level. pMS can focus defence spending on the line 
battalions, which remain entirely national, and on a 
more limited range of support functions, as some 
support functions can be abolished at the national 
level,  either  in  favour  of  participation  in  a 
multinational  Eurocorps  structure  or  because 
another Eurocorps pMS will assume responsibility 
in that particular area.  
Pooling  can  thus  be  an  important  instrument  to 
achieve  the  objectives  of  PSCD,  either  by 
deepening  integration  in  relevant  existing 
multinational  formations  (but  without  aspiring  to 
pull all existing frameworks into PSCD), or by new 
initiatives.  Today,  most  multinational  formations 
have  limited  permanent  elements  and  except  for 
FHQs  are  rarely  if  ever  the  framework  in  which 
troops are deployed. In some cases, pMS could base 
cooperation on  successful common experience  in 
providing a Battle Group, using that as a basis to 
build  a  larger-scale  and  more  permanent 
multinational  formation.  In  a  way,  the  Battle 
Groups  predict  the  pattern  of  cooperation,  as  in 
that context the usual suspects for cooperation have 
already found each other.  
Obviously,  pooling  is  easier  when  pMS  use  the 
same equipment, hence smaller pMS especially will 
inevitably  have  to  take  into  account  whom  they 
want  to  cooperate  with  as  a  major  factor  in 
procurement  decisions.  For  pooling  to  increase 
cost-effectiveness,  national  structures  and  bases 
must  naturally  be  pooled  and  thus  in  some 
instances cut.  
The Crucial Role of the EDA  
Art. 3 of the Protocol gives a crucial role to the 
EDA,  which  “shall  contribute  to  the  regular 
assessment  of  pMS’  contributions  [...]  and  shall 
report  thereon  at  least  once  a  year”.  A  binding 
commitment  needs  a  body  overseeing  its 
implementation. Art. 46 (4) TEU even provides for 
the possibility of suspension from PSCD if a pMS 
no longer fulfils the criteria. Those decisions will be 
taken  by  the  pMS,  on  the  basis  of  the  data 
collection and assessment by the EDA.  
Enabling the EDA to fulfil this task has a number 
of  implications,  translated  into  the  following 
proposals:  
•  Obviously,  pMS  must  continue  to  show  full 
transparency to the EDA about all aspects of  
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their defence effort. The EDA must be able to 
freely  enter  into  contact  with  all  relevant 
national authorities of pMS.  
•  The EDA  will  have to  organize  itself  for  its 
assessment role. If additional staff or funds are 
required, pMS should provide these, according 
to GDP. Contribution of national personnel to 
the relevant EDA body would ensure that the 
views  of  all  pMS  are  represented  in  each 
assessment.  
•  In view of democratic accountability and as a 
measure  of  peer  pressure,  the  results  of  the 
assessment process should as far as possible be 
made public. This could be part of an EDA 
Yearbook on CSDP, a comprehensive report 
on CSDP policies and current operations, but 
focussing  in  particular  on  capability 
development  and  the  contribution  of  each 
pMS.  
A real assessment of capabilities concerns not just 
the figures, but performance in the field. In addition 
to the role of the EDA and on a voluntary basis, 
pMS could also agree to exercises and manoeuvres 
and “tactical evaluation” by the EU Military Staff, 
which  could  in  time  lead  to  a  process  of 
certification.  
Common Funding  
The decision to launch a CSDP operation is taken 
by the Council acting unanimously and thus each 
time  reflects  the  broadest  political  solidarity. 
However, the current rules governing the sharing 
among Member States of expenditures arising from 
the military implications of such an operation do 
not reflect a similar solidarity. For military CSDP 
operations  very  few  expenditures  are  eligible  for 
common  funding.  The  guiding  principle  is  still 
“costs lie where they fall”, meaning in practise that 
those  Member  States  providing  the  required 
military forces and capabilities also have the honour 
to  pay  for  the  bulk  of  the  total  cost  of  a  given 
operation.  More  solidarity  in  terms  of  funding 
would  encourage  more  Member  States  to 
participate  with  even  larger  military  contributions 
and  ease  the  process  of  “Force  Generation 
Conferences”.   
For CSDP operations, pMS could be encouraged to 
create in PSCD their own more equitable system of 
burden-sharing, based on common funding. A key 
to  share  the  global  common  costs  among  pMS 
would be established (which could be similar to the 
one used at present by Member States for CSDP 
operations). Contributing capabilities mentioned in 
the  Statement  of  Requirements  would  however 
count as a contribution in kind. pMS would thus be 
encouraged to invest in the “right” capabilities and 
to effectively deploy them.  
Launching and Governing PSCD  
The Treaty states that the Member States intending 
to participate notify the Council, which will launch 
PSCD by a Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) of all 
Member  States,  after  consulting  the  High 
Representative (Art. 46 (2) TEU). Later admissions, 
and suspensions, will be decided upon by QMV of 
the pMS only. All other decisions will be taken by 
unanimity of the pMS.  
In order to signal their commitment and ensure the 
necessary political impetus, it is proposed that pMS 
mark the creation of PSCD by a declaration at the 
level of the European Council. Only the Heads of 
State and Government can provide the high-level 
political  impetus  that  will  stimulate  Foreign  and 
Defence Ministers to take action. The annual report 
on PSCD by the EDA should be discussed at that 
level as well, for the European Council to define 
general guidelines. Within those guidelines pMS in 
the Foreign  Affairs  Council,  chaired  by  the High 
Representative, can adopt the necessary decisions. 
Within the board of the EDA, pMS’ Ministers of 
Defence  should  also  meet  regularly,  e.g.  twice 
yearly, in order to monitor progress and inform the 
Council  and  European  Council  prior  to  the 
discussion  of  the  annual  report.  Within  the  EU 
Military  Committee  too  and  the  working  groups 
advising it, pMS can discuss PSCD.  
pMS  can  thus  make  full  use  of  all  existing  EU 
institutions to govern capability development in the 
context  of  PSCD.  In  order  to  ensure  full 
coordination, non-pMS can always participate in all 
PSCD-related  discussions,  without  voting  rights. 
That will also ensure maximum information when 
deciding on operations, always by unanimity of all 
Member States.   
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